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Summary 
This report presents results of using a dynamic Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) 
model for the Netherlands to study water issues. We simulate the economic conse-
quences for different emission reduction scenarios ranging from 20 to 50 percent emis-
sion reduction from 2015 onwards with respect to emission levels in 2000, and compare 
these to results for scenarios with a derogation of the target until 2027. As marginal 
abatement costs for small amounts of reduction are relatively low and autonomous de-
velopments (including existing policies) have already established a partial decoupling of 
economic activity and emissions, a 20% of emission reductions can be achieved through 
adjustments in the economy that are virtually costless from a macro-economic perspec-
tive. Although the production level in the Agricultural sector decreases, this is compen-
sated by increases in the Abatement sector. As the stringency of the policy target in-
creases towards a 50 percent emission reduction, the impacts become visible at the 
macro-economic level: GDP and NNI levels are decreasing, and the welfare loss, meas-
ured via the Equivalent Variation, becomes non-negligible.  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of the WEMPA project is to develop an integrated and operational water and 
economy model that will enable us to determine the economic effects of measures to im-
prove the water quality and subsequently the ecological quality of rivers, regional and 
local waters. An important requisite of this model is that it must be shaped in such a way 
that it is suitable for applying cost effectiveness analysis of implementing measures 
within the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) (2000/60/EC) in the Netherlands. The 
existing models used to assess cost-effectiveness of measures are usually not integrated 
and are either pure hydrologic models or economic models. With this integrated model, 
we will be able to analyse the economic effects of implementing measures in a particular 
economic sector, and the impacts on other economic sectors as well. Eventually, the in-
tegrated water and economy model should be able to select the most efficient combina-
tion of measures to fulfil the goals of WFD. 
For the Netherlands, there is no comprehensive hydro-economic model to calculate the 
economic consequences of the WFD (see Reinhard and Linderhof, 2006). In fact, there is 
no economic model that explicitly includes physical water flows. Brouwer et al. (2007) 
have made a first attempt to estimate the economic consequences of the implementation 
of the WFD using a static AGE model that includes water related emissions for the dif-
ferent economic sectors. The disadvantage of the static AGE model is that it focuses on 
comparative static analyses (short run) and ignores the long-run impacts which are par-
ticularly interesting in the case of analyzing the impact of the implementation of the 
WFD in 2015. Therefore, we adapt the DEAN model as described in Dellink (2005) and 
Dellink and Van Ierland (2005) to study the economic impacts of the implementation of 
the WFD. The model, DEAN-W, is an adaptation of the DEAN model and it incorpo-
rates similar elements as the static AGE model of Brouwer et al. (2007).1 
The water quality requirements of the WFD are yet unknown, which makes it impossible 
to calculate the exact consequences of the implementation of the WFD. Furthermore, the 
dynamic AGE model requires standards for emissions for the environmental themes 
rather than water quality standards, and the water quality requirements have to be trans-
lated into emission standards for water related substances. Therefore, we simulate the 
economic consequences for different emission reduction scenarios ranging from 20 to 50 
percent emission reduction from 2015 onwards with respect to emission levels in 2000. 
The implementation of the WFD will be executed gradually (see Van der Veeren, 2005; 
Brouwer, 2005) and we assume that the implementation will start effectively in 2008. In 
addition, we compare these to results for scenarios with a derogation of the target until 
2027 (see Van der Veeren, 2005, for a discussion of the appropriate emission reduction 
scenarios). Given the assumed autonomous emission reduction over time in the DEAN-
W model, the required 50 percent emission reduction in 2015 is roughly equivalent to a 
50 percent emission reduction compared to the benchmark. A derogated target of 50% 
                                                   
1
  First preliminary results, using 1990 as the base year, were presented in Dellink and Linder-
hof (2006), and a second interim report (Dellink and Linderhof, 2007) contains updated re-
sults using preliminary data for 2000. 
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reduction implies a 20% reduction of emissions in 2015 compared to the benchmark. 
Other assumptions might change these results. Note that these scenarios differ from the 
scenarios presented in Dellink and Linderhof (2006) in two ways. First, Dellink and Lin-
derhof (2006) assume that the emission reduction scenarios are effectively implemented 
in the year 2015 instead of a gradual implementation from 2008 onwards. Secondly, they 
also assume that emission reduction scenarios are related to the bench mark or the busi-
ness-as-usual scenario instead of a norm with respect to the emission level in a particular 
year.  
Section 2 describes the general features of the DEAN model, and the way it is adapted to 
study water economics. Section 3 deals with the calibration of the model, and Section 4 
presents the results of the first, preliminary calculations. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. DEAN-W model description 
2.1 General description of the DEAN model2 
DEAN3 is a forward-looking neo-classical growth model. This model type has the ad-
vantage that the specification is fully dynamic: the agents take not only the current state 
of the economy, but also future situations into account when making decisions that affect 
current and future welfare. This intertemporal aspect lacks in recursive-dynamic models. 
Moreover, the transition path from the original balanced growth path to a new growth 
path is more flexible and realistic in a model with an endogenous savings rate (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1995). A full set of model equations is given in Dellink (2005); the main 
features of the model will be discussed briefly below. 
Consumption of different goods and environmental services are combined in a nested 
CES utility function. Each level of consumption requires some combination of pollution 
permits and abatement, as will be explained in more detail below. Non-unitary income 
elasticities are specified using the Linear Expenditure System approach. 
The private households have income from the sale of their endowments of capital goods 
and labour, reduced with lumpsum transfers to the government. The government has 
three sources of income: sale of the pollution permits, the lumpsum transfer from the 
private households and tax revenues. The lumpsum transfers are endogenously adjusted 
to ensure budget balance for the government. 
Effective labour supply grows with an exogenous rate as a combination of demographic 
developments and increases in labour productivity. Capital formation is based on an ex-
ogenous interest rate and endogenous capital stock. To account for capital stocks after 
the model’s time horizon, a transversality condition is included. 
Producer behaviour is specified through a nested CES production function for domestic 
supply and through a zero-profit condition.  
World market prices are exogenously given (in foreign currency), and the international 
market is big enough to satisfy demand for imports and absorb supply of exports at these 
international prices. Under these conditions, all international trade links with other coun-
tries can be aggregated into one additional sector in the model, ‘Rest of the World’ 
(RoW). The demand by this sector represents exports and the supply is imports; the 
budget deficit is exogenously given and the endogenous exchange rate ensures that equi-
librium is attained. The reactions on the markets to changes in domestic prices are speci-
fied by the Armington approach by assuming that domestic and foreign goods are imper-
fect substitutes. The market balance conditions for produced goods, domestic demand, 
the capital and labour market close the model. 
 
                                                   
2
 This section is based on Dellink (2005) and Dellink and Van Ierland (2005). 
3
 Acronym for “Dynamic applied general Equilibrium model with pollution and Abatement for 
the Netherlands”. 
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2.2 Pollution and abatement 
Production and consumption processes lead to pollution (emissions). Allowances to emit 
polluting substances to the environment are linked to production output and consump-
tion. The government sets the environmental policy targets exogenously by issuing a re-
stricted number of pollution permits4 and redistributing the proceeds to the private 
households in a lumpsum manner. In this way, a market for pollution permits is created, 
where prices are determined endogenously by equating demand and supply. Polluters 
have the choice between paying for their pollution permits or increasing their expendi-
tures on pollution abatement. This choice is endogenous in the model, and the polluters 
will always choose the cheaper of the two. A third possibility for producers and consum-
ers is to reduce their production and consumption of pollution intensive goods, respec-
tively. This becomes a sensible option when both the marginal abatement cost and the 
price of the permits are higher than the value added foregone in reducing production or 
utility foregone in reducing consumption. In the benchmark projection, the government 
distributes exactly the number of permits that allows the producers and consumers to 
maintain their original behaviour. 
A key feature of the model is that the expenditures on abatement are explicitly specified 
to capture as much information as possible about the technical measures underlying the 
abatement options. The supply of ‘abatement goods’ is modelled through a separate pro-
ducer whose production inputs represent the cost components of the underlying technical 
measures. For each environmental theme, abatement cost curves are constructed, using 
detailed technical data (cf. Dellink, 2005). This procedure involves making an inventory 
of all known options available to reduce pollution, including end-of-pipe measures and 
process-integrated measures. A constant elasticity of substitution governs how much ad-
ditional abatement effort is needed to reduce pollution by one additional unit. The esti-
mated CES-elasticity describes the environmental theme-specific possibilities to substi-
tute between pollution and abatement goods (the Pollution – Abatement Substitution or 
PAS curve) and reflects marginal abatement costs (cf. Dellink, 2005). 
The existing technical potential to reduce pollution through abatement activities, i.e. 
without economic restructuring, provides an absolute upper bound on technical abate-
ment in the model. This is a clear difference with the traditional quadratic abatement cost 
curves, where no true upper bound on abatement activities exists. The empirical impor-
tance of an absolute limit on environmental technology has been emphasised by Hueting 
(1996).  
Autonomous pollution efficiency improvements result in a relative decoupling of eco-
nomic growth and pollution. The development of abatement possibilities and abatement 
costs over time are captured via specific parameters that govern the changes in technical 
potential for pollution reduction over time, and efficiency improvements in the abate-
ment sector. In the current specification of the model, these developments in the abate-
ment possibilities and costs, i.e. innovation of new abatement measures, are driven by 
                                                   
4
 Practical considerations may lead to a different choice of policy instrument in reality. Nonethe-
less, the approach taken here can serve as a reference point for evaluating other policy in-
struments. 
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exogenous parameters. Nonetheless, the model does contain endogenous diffusion of ex-
isting abatement technology. 
2.3 Adaptations of the model for WEMPA 
In order to investigate the economic consequences of the implementation of the WFD 
properly, DEAN-W differs in a number of aspects from DEAN. First, the time horizon of 
DEAN-W has been truncated to 2040, as the actual implementation of the WFD is due in 
2015, with possible derogation of efforts to 20275. Secondly, DEAN considers time peri-
ods of 5 years; given the much shorter model horizon in the DEAN-W model, this level 
of aggregation is unnecessary. Therefore, annual results are calculated for the period 
2000 – 2039. Thirdly, DEAN considers policies for several environmental themes that 
are not directly relevant here. These policies are removed from the analysis, as they 
might interfere with the analysis of the water-related policies. Fourthly, DEAN does not 
consider the environmental theme ‘Dispersion of toxic substances to Water’. The infor-
mation on this environmental theme, as available in WEMPA, has been incorporated into 
the model. 
Together, these changes ensure that a suitable tool is used for the analysis of the eco-
nomic impacts of the water related policies discussed above.
                                                   
5
  Given the forward-looking behaviour of agents in the model, and the calculation of an infi-
nite horizon welfare change, it is essential to use a model horizon that is sufficiently far in the 
future. As an indication: the present value (in year 2000) of a hundred Euro in 2050 using a 
discount rate of 5 percent is almost 9 Euro (excluding inflation, i.e. in Euros of 2000). 
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3. Data and scenarios 
3.1 Calibration of the base year 
The base year data are derived from the most recent statistics for the year 2000 by Statis-
tics Netherlands. With the most recent data that is available for economic activity and 
emissions the model parameters are calibrated. On the production side, 27 producers of 
private goods are identified; this allows for a moderate degree of detail on the side of 
economic and environmental diversity. A more disaggregated set-up was not feasible 
due to environmental data limitations. There are two consumer groups: private house-
holds and the government.  
Table 3.1. Sectoral economic data for The Netherlands, 2000 
 (in million Euro at 2000 prices). 
 
Sector number & description1 
SBI-code 
(1993)2 
Production 2000 
mln Euro  (share) 
Consumption 2000 
mln Euro  (share) 
1 Agriculture and fisheries 01 – 05 18,835 (2.9%) 2,332 (1.0%) 
2 Extraction of oil and natural gas 11 10,240 (1.6%) 0 (0.0%) 
3 Other mining and quarrying 10, 14 0,807 (0.1%) 26 (0.0%) 
4 Food and food products industry 15, 16 35,026 (5.4%) 12,880 (5.5%) 
5 Textiles, clothing and leather industry 17 – 19 3,331 (0.5%) 5,065 (2.2%) 
6 Paper and –board industry 21 3,782 (0.6%) 650 (0.3%) 
7 Printing industry 22 10,988 (1.7%) 3,262 (1.4%) 
8 Oil refineries 23 15,992 (2.5%) 1,694 (0.7%) 
9 Chemical industry 24 23,409 (3.6%) 2,745 (1.2%) 
10 Rubber and plastics industry 25 5,227 (0.8%) 540 (0.2%) 
11 Basic metals industry 27 4,896 (0.8%) 6 (0.0%) 
12 Metal products industry 28 11,115 (1.7%) 490 (0.2%) 
13 Machine industry 29 – 31 12,831 (2.0%) 224 (0.1%) 
14 Electromechanical industry 32, 33 16,925 (2.6%) 3,683 (1.6%) 
15 Transport equipment industry 34, 35 10,373 (1.6%) 4,040 (1.7%) 
16 Other industries 20, 26, 36, 37 14,613 (2.3%) 6,193 (2.6%) 
17 Energy distribution 40 12,651 (2.0%) 5,153 (2.2%) 
18 Water distribution 41 1,456 (0.2%) 927 (0.4%) 
19 Construction 45 46,515 (7.2%) 898 (0.4%) 
20 Trade and related services 50 – 55 99,607 (15.4%) 13,440 (5.7%) 
21 Transport by land 60 14,564 (2.3%) 3,563 (1.5%) 
22 Transport by water 61 4,450 (0.7%) 219 (0.1%) 
23 Transport by air 62 7,047 (1.1%) 1,035 (0.4%) 
24 Transport services 63 11,038 (1.7%) 3,895 (1.7%) 
25 Commercial services 64 – 74 134,062 (20.8%) 57,771 (24.6%) 
26 Non-commercial services 75 – 95 104,677 (16.2%) 97,565 (41.5%) 
27 Other goods and services 99 10,462 (1.6%) 6,904 (2.9%) 
1
 Goods are represented by their production sector. 
2
 See Statistics Netherlands (1996) for an explanation and official description of the sectors. 
 
Some characteristics of production in The Netherlands in 2000 are shown in Table 3.1. 
Total production value is given both in absolute amounts and as share of total production 
value in the economy. The column for total consumption shows absolute and relative 
consumption levels for private households and government together. The largest sectors 
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in terms of production value, value added and consumption are Non-commercial services 
(21% of production value) and Commercial services (17% of production value). 
Since the analysis of the WFD concerns only emissions to surface waters, emission data 
from Statistics Netherlands are used (Statistics Netherlands, 2007). 6 Emissions of 
euthrophying substances are concentrated to a large extent in the Agricultural sector and 
with Households. As shown in Table 3.2, these two sector both account for around 40 
percent of all emissions. In addition, both sectors emit large quantities of toxic sub-
stances. The Chemical industry is also responsible for substantial emissions of eutrophy-
ing substances and the dispersion of toxic substances to water (see Section 3.3 for the 
definition of the individual substances of this theme).  
Table 3.2: Sectoral emissions for Eutrophication and Dispersion to Water for The 
Netherlands, 2000. 
 Eutrophication Dispersion to Water 
Sector number & description 
mln P-
equivalents (share) 
bln AETP-
equivalents (share) 
1 Agriculture and fisheries 11.79 (43.6%) 57.15 (27.5%) 
2 Extraction of oil and natural gas 0.00 (0.0%) 0.01 (0.0%) 
3 Other mining and quarrying 0.00 (0.0%) 0.03 (0.0%) 
4 Food and food products industry 1.68 (6.2%) 6.49 (3.1%) 
5 Textiles, clothing and leather industry 0.08 (0.3%) 2.94 (1.4%) 
6 Paper and –board industry 0.09 (0.3%) 1.37 (0.7%) 
7 Printing industry 0.00 (0.0%) 2.00 (1.0%) 
8 Oil refineries 0.05 (0.2%) 1.83 (0.9%) 
9 Chemical industry 1.82 (6.7%) 15.04 (7.2%) 
10 Rubber and plastics industry 0.01 (0.0%) 0.73 (0.3%) 
11 Basic metals industry 0.11 (0.4%) 5.02 (2.4%) 
12 Metal products industry 0.02 (0.1%) 15.77 (7.6%) 
13 Machine industry 0.00 (0.0%) 1.84 (0.9%) 
14 Electromechanical industry 0.07 (0.2%) 4.36 (2.1%) 
15 Transport equipment industry 0.01 (0.0%) 3.85 (1.9%) 
16 Other industries 0.01 (0.0%) 4.10 (2.0%) 
17 Energy distribution 0.00 (0.0%) 0.06 (0.0%) 
18 Water distribution 0.01 (0.0%) 0.01 (0.0%) 
19 Construction 0.00 (0.0%) 0.62 (0.3%) 
20 Trade and related services 0.01 (0.0%) 1.37 (0.7%) 
21 Transport by land 0.01 (0.0%) 1.99 (1.0%) 
22 Transport by water 0.00 (0.0%) 3.41 (1.6%) 
23 Transport by air 0.00 (0.0%) 0.03 (0.0%) 
24 Transport services 0.00 (0.0%) 0.09 (0.0%) 
25 Commercial services 0.00 (0.0%) 2.15 (1.0%) 
26 Non-commercial services 0.01 (0.0%) 2.04 (1.0%) 
27 Other goods and services 0.00 (0.0%) 0.38 (0.2%) 
Private households  11.29 (41.7%) 72.85 (35.1%) 
Total  27.07 (100%) 207.52 (100%) 
 
                                                   
6
  Please note that in the interim reports, total emissions as reported in Hofkes et al. (2004) 
were used. 
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One technical problem that has to be dealt with is the fact that the environmental services 
sector, which includes the waste water treatment plants amongst others and is part of the 
Non-commercial services, prevents substantial amounts of emissions, for instance due to 
household organic waste and manure that is incinerated or dumped. In the original data, 
this is represented as negative emissions. These negative emissions are larger than the 
positive emissions in the other parts of the Non-commercial services, and consequently 
the total sector Non-commercial services would have negative emission coefficients. 
This can lead to technical problems in the model if a system of pollution permits is in-
troduced; therefore the negative net emissions in environmental services are re-attributed 
to the sectors in which these emissions have originated, such as the agricultural sector 
and the households. 
3.2 Calibration of the abatement cost curve for Eutrophication 
The substances that cause Eutrophication are phosphorus (P) and nitrogen (N). They 
mainly stem from agricultural use of fertiliser and manure, but emissions of NH3 and 
NOx contribute as well. The substances can be aggregated into P-equivalents by dividing 
nitrogen emissions by 10, reflecting the lower environmental impact of N emissions. The 
measures to reduce Eutrophication amount to a number of 40 options, many of which 
also contribute to abatement of acidifying emissions. The curve, together with the CES 
approximation, is given in Figure 3.1.7 
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Figure 3.1: Abatement cost curve for eutrophication in 2000. 
 
Reduction of Eutrophication concentrates in the sectors agriculture, industry and sewer-
age, resulting in a maximum reduction of emissions of just over 120 million P-
                                                   
7
  An update of these curves, using improved information on abatement measures for specific 
sectors, is envisaged as part of future research. 
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equivalents, around 62 percent of total emissions. The most important measure consists 
of elimination of excess manure, which reduces over 65 million P equivalents at a yearly 
cost of about 1.3 billion euro. Due to lack of data this measure could not be subdivided 
into its components, which include also dephosphating and denitrifying of wastewater 
from industry and households. Further steps in reduction relate to additional measures in 
sewerage and water purification, and one of the measures at the very end of the curve is 
relocation of farms: a reduction of 0.14 million P equivalents at the cost of more than 
100 million Euro yearly. 
3.3 Calibration of the abatement cost curve for Dispersion to Water 
The environmental theme ‘dispersion of toxic substances to water’ consists of 8 heavy 
metals (mercury, cadmium, lead, zinc, copper, nickel, chromium, and arsenic) and the to-
tal of 9 Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs). The substances can be aggregated to 
‘(aquatic eco)toxicity equivalents’ using the Aquatic Eco-Toxicity Potentials (AETPs) as 
shown in Table 3.3. In our calculations, we use the equivalence factors suggested by Van 
der Woerd et al, to ensure consistency between the abatement cost curve and the emis-
sion data. Note, however, that since then, new equivalence factors have been proposed in 
Huijbregts et al. (2000). 
Van der Woerd et al. (2000) provide 127 independent options to reduce dispersion of 
toxic substances to water for 1995. With additional assumptions as described in Hofkes 
et al. (2004), we construct the abatement cost curve for 2000. The reduction potential is 
kept constant and proportionally with the level of emissions. The abatement costs are 
corrected for the changes in the consumer price index between 1995 and 2000.  
Figure 3.2 shows the total amount of abatement costs and emission reduction potential 
for ‘dispersion of toxic substances to water’. Based on the information of individual 
measures, we approximate the cost abatement curve in a CES structure that will be used 
in the model calculations.8 
                                                   
8
  An update of these curves, using improved information on abatement measures for specific 
sectors, is envisaged as part of future research. 
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Dispersion of toxic substances to water, 2000
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Figure 3.2. Abatement cost curve for dispersion of toxic substances to water in 2000. 
 
Table 3.3: Equivalences among substances in the environmental theme ‘Dispersion of 
toxic substances to water’. 
Dispersion of toxic substances to water 
1 million kg 1.4-dichlo-robezene equivalent = 
3.6 kg mercury 
3.4 kg cadmium 
666.7 kg lead 
55.6 kg zinc 
3.2 kg copper 
0.3 kg nickel 
217.4 kg chromium 
6.3 kg arsenic 
13.0 kg PAHs 
Source: Van der Woerd et al. (2000). 
3.4 Calibration of the parameters 
The values of the most important parameters are derived from trend analysis over the pe-
riod 1990 – 2000; together with the data for the base year they govern the benchmark 
projection of the economy. For a detailed justification of the parameter values, see Del-
link (2005). 
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The growth rate of labour supply equals 2 percent; and a stable annual interest rate of 4% 
is used.9 The steady-state relationship between investments and capital is used to calcu-
late a depreciation rate of 3 percent. The values for the substitution elasticities and the 
nesting structure for the production functions, the utility function and the international 
trade functions are taken from Gerlagh et al. (2002) and represent adaptation possibilities 
for the medium term. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution has to be calibrated 
only for the private households; the value equals 0.5. 
The pollution-abatement-substitution (PAS) elasticities, benchmark price of the emission 
permits and technical potential for pollution reduction are directly derived from the 
abatement cost curves (Dellink, 2005). The growth rate of the technical potential for pol-
lution reduction is based on a comparison of the abatement cost curves for 1990 and 
2000, using Hofkes et al. (2002) and Brouwer et al. (2007). The autonomous pollution 
efficiency improvements are calibrated for each environmental theme separately using 
the realised development of emission levels between 1995 and 2000; the ad-hoc assump-
tion is made that these effects of current policies will fade over time, leading to a stabili-
sation of benchmark emissions in the long run.10 The autonomous abatement efficiency 
improvement is calibrated to 0.5 percent per year throughout the model horizon. 
 
                                                   
9
  This interest rate is 1 percent point lower than in Dellink (2005), to reflect recent develop-
ments.  
10
  Pollution efficiency improvements reflect the impacts of other environmental policies, such 
as the European Nitrate Directive (91/676/EC), Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive 
(91/271/EC) amongst others. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Benchmark development and policy scenarios 
In the benchmark, the economy is assumed to be on a balanced growth path. Economic 
activity increases with 2 percent per year, whereas the growth rates for emissions are de-
termined by the combination of the economic growth rate, and the assumed autonomous 
pollution efficiency improvements.  
The water quality requirements of the WFD are yet unknown, which makes it impossible 
to calculate the exact consequences of the implementation of the WFD. Furthermore, the 
dynamic AGE model requires standards for emissions for the environmental themes 
rather than water quality standards, and the water quality requirements have to be trans-
lated into emission standards for water related substances. Therefore, we simulate the 
economic consequences for different emission reduction scenarios ranging from 20 to 50 
percent emission reduction from 2015 onwards with respect to emission levels in 2000. 
The implementation of the WFD will be executed gradually (see Van der Veeren, 2005; 
Brouwer, 2005) and we assume that the implementation will start effectively in 2008. In 
addition, we compare these to results for scenarios with a derogation of the target until 
2027 (see Van der Veeren, 2005, for a discussion of the appropriate emission reduction 
scenarios). Given the assumed autonomous emission reduction over time in the DEAN-
W model, the required 50 percent emission reduction in 2015 is roughly equivalent to a 
50 percent emission reduction compared to the benchmark. A derogated target of 50% 
reduction implies a 20% reduction of emissions in 2015 compared to the benchmark. 
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Figure 4.1. Development of GDP in the benchmark projection. 
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Figure 4.1 presents the benchmark development of GDP. Developments of emissions 
and emission targets for the different scenarios are given in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 for Eu-
trophication and Dispersion of heavy metals to water, respectively. 
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Figure 4.2. Development of emissions of eutrophying substances over time in different 
scenarios. 
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Figure 4.3. Development of emissions of dispersion of toxic substances to water over 
time in different scenarios. 
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4.2 Attaining the reduction target by 2015 
The main results of the environmental policy where the emissions for Eutrophication and 
Dispersion simultaneously have to be reduced by 20 percent with respect to the emission 
level of 2000 are represented in Table 4.1. Given the reduction in emissions between 
2000 and 2015 as a result of existing policies (see Section 3.4), the target for Eutrophica-
tion is not strictly binding: benchmark emissions are below the target. Thus, no addi-
tional efforts are required for this theme (see the emission reduction in percentage 
change compared to the benchmark projection in Table 3.3), when the required emission 
reduction is limited to 20% below 2000 levels. For Dispersion to Water, the target is 
binding: from 2015 onwards, emissions will have to be reduced almost 10 percent below 
benchmark projection levels. As marginal abatement costs for small amounts of reduc-
tion are relatively cheap, these emission reductions can completely be achieved through 
the implementation of low-cost technical measures. The macroeconomic results suggest 
that these adjustments in the economy are virtually costless. This does not mean that 
there are no substantial differences in terms of volume changes between the production 
of economic sectors. While there is hardly any change for the Service sectors, Agricul-
ture suffers a 1.5% loss of production volume. 
Table 4.1: Main results for a required 20% reduction in emissions 
  2010 2015 2020 2030 
Macroeconomic results (%-change in volumes compared to benchmark projection) 
GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NNI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total private consumption 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total production 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Capital investment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sectoral results (%-change in volumes compared to benchmark projection) 
Private consumption Agriculture -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Private consumption Industry 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Private consumption Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sectoral production Agriculture -1.4 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 
Sectoral production Industry -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Sectoral production Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sectoral production Abatement services 24.9 28.0 28.0 28.0 
Environmental results (%-change in volumes compared to benchmark projection) 
Emissions Eutrophication 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Emissions Dispersion to Water -3.6 -9.5 -9.5 -9.5 
Prices of main variables (constant 2000 prices) 
Wage rate index (benchmark index = 1) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Exchange rate index (benchmark index = 1) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Price of abatement services (bm. index = 1) 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Price Eutrophication permits (bm. index = 1) 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.3 
Price Dispersion permits (bm. index = 1) 1.5 2.1 2.3 2.8 
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The prices of emission permits for Eutrophication and Dispersion to Water both increase 
over time, but remain at a low level. Though the required percentage reduction in emis-
sions remains constant from 2015 onwards, the permit price increases over time reflect-
ing the autonomous efficiency improvements in the benchmark11, that induce compensat-
ing price increases; this effect carries over from the benchmark to the counterfactual 
simulations. 
Note, however, that there is still uncertainty whether the scenario of 20 percent emission 
reduction compared to the emission in the year 2000 is sufficient to meet the water qual-
ity targets of the WFD in 2015. Stone et al. (forthcoming) calculate the water quality im-
pacts of the different emission reduction scenarios calculated with DEAN-W.  
Table 4.2 shows the main results for the more stringent policy where emission reductions 
of 50 percent (compared to emission levels in 2000) are required. As the stringency of 
the policy increases, the impacts become visible at the macro-economic level: GDP and 
NNI levels are decreasing. In the short run, the economic growth rate is reduced to below 
the benchmark level of 2 percent, the effect is strongest in 2015, where the growth rate 
equals 1.6 percent. But after 2015 the adjustment process stabilizes and the growth rate 
returns to 2 percent annually. The level of GDP and NNI is, however, permanently 
lower.  For both themes, the more stringent target is binding, and from 2015 onwards 
emissions have to be reduced below benchmark projection levels by 36 and 43 percent, 
respectively. This stimulates production in the Abatement services sector. Note that most 
of the results for the years 2020 and 2030 are similar to the results for the year 2015 due 
to the fact that DEAN-W assumes a balanced growth path. As a consequence, the emis-
sions stabilize after the WFD target is reached in 2015. 
Not surprisingly, the Agricultural sector substantially reduces its production levels, as 
this sector is the largest emitter of eutrophying substances and one of the largest emitters 
of toxic substances. Production levels of the industrial sectors decrease by around 4 per-
cent. Thus, a shift in production from agriculture and industry towards the emission ex-
tensive services sector is induced. Aggregate production levels are also negative af-
fected, but the reduction in consumption is limited, mainly due to lower investments. 
In the short run, consumers anticipate on the environmental policy by changing their sav-
ings/consumption decision. Households increase their consumption in the short run at the 
expense of savings, as this has a positive effect on welfare, while accepting a lower 
growth rate of the economy (as the lower savings translate into lower investments and 
consequently into a lower growth rate of capital) and thus lower consumption levels in 
the long run. This reduction in the growth rate of the economy is one part of the optimal 
mix of reactions to the stringent environmental policy, together with expenditures on 
abatement and a restructuring of the economy. As consumers optimize their intertempo-
ral utility function, this mix is the cost-effective response to the new policy. 
                                                   
11
  These efficiency improvements imply that the volume of inputs of emission permits in the 
benchmark reduces over time; this is compensated by a simultaneous increase in benchmark 
prices, such that the value of these inputs is in line with the common growth rate of the 
benchmark projection, i.e. the value share of all inputs remains constant in the benchmark 
projection. 
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Table 4.2. Main results for a required 50% reduction in emissions 
  2010 2015 2020 2030 
Macroeconomic results (%-change in volumes compared to benchmark projection) 
GDP -0.2 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 
NNI 0.0 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 
Total private consumption 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 
Total production -0.2 -1.4 -1.5 -1.5 
Capital investment -1.0 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 
Sectoral results (%-change in volumes compared to benchmark projection) 
Private consumption Agriculture 0.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 
Private consumption Industry 0.1 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 
Private consumption Services 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Sectoral production Agriculture -2.0 -33.2 -33.2 -33.2 
Sectoral production Industry -0.5 -4.1 -4.1 -4.1 
Sectoral production Services 0.0 1.4 1.3 1.3 
Sectoral production Abatement services 38.1 93.7 93.7 93.6 
Environmental results (%-change in volumes compared to benchmark projection) 
Emissions Eutrophication -13.6 -36.4 -36.4 -36.4 
Emissions Dispersion to Water -16.3 -43.4 -43.4 -43.4 
Prices of main variables (constant 2000 prices) 
Wage rate index (benchmark index = 1) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Exchange rate index (benchmark index = 1) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Price of abatement services (bm. index = 1) 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Price Eutrophication permits (bm. index = 1) 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Price Dispersion permits (bm. index = 1) 1.9 175.1 174.7 174.0 
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Figure 4.4. Percentage change in GDP – development over time 
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Figure 4.4 shows the development of the percentage change in GDP over time in the dif-
ferent scenarios. The figure reflects that limited emission reduction targets can be met at 
little or no macroeconomic costs, but the economic costs of the policy increases more 
than proportionately with the stringency of the policy. This is trivial: first, the cheapest 
options to reduce emissions are implemented, and further reductions will have to be real-
ized through more costly adjustments. The costs of economic adjustments also increase 
more than proportionately with stringency, as consumers prefer to stay as close as possi-
ble to the original consumption bundle. 
Figure 4.5 clearly shows the differences in impact of the environmental policy on pro-
duction levels. As expected, the magnitudes of reduction of economic activity are larger 
when environmental policies are stricter.  
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Figure 4.5. Percentage change in sectoral production levels in 2015 
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In addition, Figure 4.4 shows that the impacts increase more than proportional with the 
emission reduction scenarios ranging from 20 to 50 percent. The same picture emerges 
from Figure 4.5 for the individual industries. For most sectors the impacts for the 50 per-
cent emission reduction scenario are more than proportionally larger than the impacts for 
the 20 percent scenario. Note that this holds for sectors that suffer from the stricter emis-
sion reduction scenarios as well as for those that benefit. The main reason for this dis-
proportional impact of the emission reduction scenarios is the increasing marginal costs 
of pollution abatement and the increase in restructuring of the economy.  
This also means that the sectors that can benefit from the new policy, including not only 
the Abatement sector (cf. Tables 4.1 and 4.2), but also for example Transport by Air, are 
best served by a stringent policy (see Figure 4.5). The positive effect on Transport by Air 
can be explained by comparing the emission levels of the different transport modes in 
Table 3.2: there are no toxic emissions attributed to this sector, whereas the other trans-
port modes have substantial emissions.12 This illustrates that the economic impacts of 
environmental policy can best be regarded as a reallocation of available resources, rather 
than as a shrink of the economy. Thus, the sectoral impacts are much larger than the 
macroeconomic results suggest. Clearly, when these water policies are embedded in a 
wider range of environmental policies, the sectoral changes will be different, as different 
environmental themes have very different emission patterns over the sectors. Dellink 
(2005) investigates these interactions between different environmental problems in de-
tail. Thus, the result that Agriculture will be most severely affected should be regarded in 
the context of a water policy only. Furthermore, a more detailed modeling of the agricul-
tural subsectors may show substantial differences between the subsectors. 
                                                   
12
 This is an artefact of the way Statistics Netherlands attributes emissions: only emissions of air-
planes when landing and taking off are accounted for as Dutch emissions; in-flight emissions 
are not attributed to the Dutch economy. 
Water Economic Modelling for Policy Analysis 20 
4.3 Derogation of reduction targets to 2027 
Table 4.3. Main results for a derogated required 50% reduction in emissions 
  2010 2015 2020 2030 
Macroeconomic results (%-change in volumes compared to benchmark projection) 
GDP -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.8 
NNI 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.8 
Total private consumption 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 
Total production -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -1.5 
Capital investment -0.5 -0.7 -1.0 -0.7 
Sectoral results (%-change in volumes compared to benchmark projection) 
Private consumption Agriculture -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -3.0 
Private consumption Industry 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.9 
Private consumption Services 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Sectoral production Agriculture -1.6 -2.0 -3.0 -33.2 
Sectoral production Industry -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -4.1 
Sectoral production Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 
Sectoral production Abatement services 28.5 39.4 56.7 93.6 
Environmental results (%-change in volumes compared to benchmark projection) 
Emissions Eutrophication -5.5 -14.6 -23.7 -36.4 
Emissions Dispersion to Water -6.5 -17.4 -28.2 -43.4 
Prices of main variables (constant 2000 prices) 
Wage rate index (benchmark index = 1) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Exchange rate index (benchmark index = 1) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Price of abatement services (bm. index = 1) 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Price Eutrophication permits (bm. index = 1) 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 
Price Dispersion permits (bm. index = 1) 1.2 2.0 4.5 173.8 
 
In the simulations presented above, the reduction target is introduced gradually and is 
fully met by 2015. The Water Framework Directive does, under special circumstances, 
allow for a derogation of these targets to 2027. This delayed target is simulated assuming 
that the gradual adjustment process will start immediately, but is prolonged until 2027, 
when the targets are fully met. The main results for this scenario are presented in Table 
4.3. Obviously, this affects the economy between 2010 and 2027, but once the emission 
reduction targets are fully implemented, the impacts are comparable to the scenario with 
targets for 2015. Thus, it can be concluded that the derogation has only a temporary ef-
fect on the economy. 
Figure 4.6 shows how the permit price for Dispersion to Water increases when the envi-
ronmental policy is implemented. These results confirm the discussion above. Notable is 
that the derogation of the policy target has no impact on the price of dispersion permits 
in the long run: these are solely determined by the strictness of the long-run policy. 
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Figure 4.6. Permit price of Dispersion to Water – development over time 
4.4 Decomposition of direct and indirect costs 
The DEAN-W model describes the costs of the policies primarily in terms of changes in 
GDP, NNI and sectoral changes in production and consumption levels. These sectoral 
and macro-economic changes are the combined effect of direct and indirect effects. In a 
CGE setting, the division between direct and indirect costs is less relevant than in partial 
analyses, where only certain costs can be assessed, while others are ignored. Nonethe-
less, our results can also be expressed in terms of direct and indirect costs by calculating 
sectors changes in generated value added; these value added changes add up to the 
change in national product. The direct sectoral costs include expenditures by the sector 
on abatement and on emission permits. The indirect costs (and benefits) include reduced 
tax payments (as by assumption the permit revenues are redistributed by lowering exist-
ing tax levels), changes in production structure and changes in production volume. Table 
4.4 shows the decomposition of costs for the 50 percent reduction scenario in 2015,13 
where production sectors are aggregated into three broad categories.14 The column 
‘Cons.’ encompasses costs to the private households and changes in value added gener-
ated through investments.  
The total costs are evaluated at 3.7 billion Euro, or 0.7 percent of the GDP in the bench-
mark projection (cf. Table 4.2). The expenditures on emission permits and the associated 
                                                   
13
  Since we are uncertain about the water quality impacts of emission reduction scenarios and 
since the WFD targets for  water quality are yet unknown, we choose the most conservative 
scenario to be the most likely scenario to meet the WFD requirements of good water quality 
status in all surface water in the Netherlands. 
14
  Obviously, the differences between individual sectors within these three broad categories are 
substantial. A more detailed analysis of direct and indirect costs is presented in Dellink 
(2008). 
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tax reduction do not have any macro-economic impact: these are merely a financial re-
distribution from the polluting sectors to the government and from the government to the 
tax payers, respectively. For the government these scenarios are budget neutral. It is 
striking to see that at  the macro-economic level the indirect costs are much larger than 
the direct costs. This can partially be explained by the concentration of emissions in rela-
tively few number of sectors: rather than investing large amounts in abatement, it may be 
less costly to accept lower production levels in these few sectors, especially Agriculture, 
and reduce emissions in that way. It should be noted that the CGE framework assumes 
that production factors that become available by reducing production in one sector can 
be usefully employed in other sectors. Thus, the macro-economic costs comprise of the 
net effect of lower value added in the “dirty” sector plus higher value added in the other 
“cleaner” sectors. Again, this shows the importance of adopting a framework that can in-
corporate indirect effects in a consistent manner. 
The sectoral direct costs reflect the shares of the different sectors in emissions (cf. Table 
3.2): the higher the emissions, the more the sector needs to spend on abatement and buy-
ing permits. As Industry is a much larger sector than Agriculture, the largest absolute 
costs are borne by Industry; the relative burden on Agriculture is however much higher. 
The sectoral indirect costs, without the tax reduction, are negative for Agriculture and 
Industry, and positive for Services. This reflects the natural tendency that the optimal re-
action to changes in policy contain a mechanism of dampening extreme effects in order 
to smoothen the adjustments and minimize the impact of the policy on consumption pat-
terns.15 At the level of individual sectors, the effects are more pronounced. For instance, 
the Food and food-products industry is confronted with the decline in Agriculture and 
this causes substantial indirect costs in this industry (almost 1.5 billion Euro). Note that 
since the total indirect benefits for the industrial sector are 1.2 billion Euro, the sum of 
indirect benefits of the other industrial sub-sectors amount to 2.8 billion Euro). Substan-
tial indirect costs are also borne by the Non-commercial services; the main reason for 
this is that substitution possibilities between production inputs are estimated to be much 
smaller than in other sectors, due to the specific nature of many of the services produced 
by this sector. Thus, this sector cannot respond as flexible to changes in relative prices as 
other sectors.  
The total costs reported for consumers contains several effects. First, households have to 
invest in abatement and buy emission permits, as they are one of the major sources of 
emissions for both environmental themes. Together, these account for 4.7 billion Euro. 
Secondly, households benefit from the lower taxes, especially from the lower VAT 
(more than 3 billion Euro), and adjusting consumption patterns as a response to changes 
in relative prices of consumer goods also increases their income with more than 3 billion 
Euro. In total, the private households have total net benefits of around 1.6 billion Euro. 
Thirdly, investment levels decrease, and hence the value added generated from invest-
ment decreases substantially; this amounts to indirect costs of almost 2.5 billion Euro. 
These effects counteract each other, and hence the total costs as reported in Table 4.4 are 
relatively low. Finally, the changes for the government comprise purely of a redistribu-
                                                   
15
  Note that in DEAN-W, initial consumption are assumed to be optimal and thus any forced 
change is considered to be detrimental to welfare. 
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tion effect: the endogenous adjustment of existing tax levels ensures that provision of 
public goods remains constant throughout all simulations, and hence the different cost 
components exactly cancel each other out. 
Table 4.4. Direct and indirect costs in 2015 (mln. Euro) for a required 50% reduction in 
emissions 
   Agric. Industry Ser-
vices
Abat 
sector
Invest-
ment 
Cons. Gov’t Total
Abatement costs Eutrophica-
tion 
1 4 0  15 0 20
 Dispersion 40 80 15  100 0 235
Eutrophica-
tion 
35 16 0  51 -102 0Tradable emission 
permits 
Dispersion 2,390 3,802 703  4,558 -11,453 0
Tax reduction  -126 -1,667 -6,145
-2,216 -3,100 13,254 0
Other indirect costs   -243 -1,240 5,294
-152 4,686 -3,208 -1,699 3,438
Total costs   2,097 994 -132 -152 2,470 -1,585 0 3,692
Remark: A negative number means benefits, while a positive number means costs. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
At low levels of environmental policy, say a 20 percent reduction in eutrophying emis-
sions and toxic substances dispersed to water compared to the historical levels in 2000, 
there are opportunities for the economic agents to adjust to the new circumstances at 
relatively low costs. Part of the emission reductions are expected to be achieved at zero 
costs, as existing policies have already induced a partial decoupling of economic activity 
and emissions. Furthermore, relatively cheap technical measures can be implemented to 
reduce emissions, and the macroeconomic impacts of the policy remain very limited. At 
more stringent levels of policy the low-cost possibilities to adjust are exhausted. Then, 
an optimal mix arises from the trade-off between the implementation of technical meas-
ures, a restructuring of the economy and a temporary slowdown of economic growth (i.e. 
increasing short-term consumption at the expense of savings).  
Since we are uncertain about the water quality impacts of emission reduction scenarios 
and since the WFD targets for water quality are yet unknown, we also calculated more 
conservative scenarios to meet the WFD requirements of good water quality status in all 
surface water in the Netherlands. Especially in the 50 percent emission reduction scenar-
ios, the economic impacts of the implementation of the WFD increase more than propor-
tional in comparison with the increase of the stringency of the emission reduction target. 
The main reason is that the marginal costs of abating pollution increase more than pro-
portional when the emission reduction target are set at 50 percent; simply put, the cheap-
est adjustment options are implemented first, and the more stringent the policy becomes, 
the more polluters have to resort to costly abatement measures or economic restructur-
ing. Especially emission intensive sectors such as Agriculture and a number of the Indus-
trial sectors suffer from more stringent emission reduction scenarios. On the other hand, 
a few sectors (Air transport, for instance) benefit from the emission reduction. In fact, 
these sectors have more than proportional increases in benefits when the emission reduc-
tion targets increase.  
The direct and indirect economic costs of the WFD policy can be attributed to different 
sectors by examining changes in value added, and the direct costs can also be attributed 
to the two environmental themes by comparing emission permit prices and abatement 
expenditures. The results show that the direct and indirect costs differ widely at the level 
of individual economic sectors, while at the macro-economic level this distinction is ir-
relevant. In the case of a 50 percent emission reduction scenario, Agriculture has large 
direct cost and small indirect benefits. The services sectors have benefits (primarily in 
the form of tax reductions), which overcompensate the other direct and indirect costs. 
This emission reduction scenario induces a restructuring of the economy from Agricul-
ture and Industry towards the Service sector. Consumers (households) face high costs for 
the purchase of emission permits but are compensated by large tax reductions. For the 
government, the implementation is budget neutral. Note that these effects are the effect 
of a water policy only. When the water policies are embedded into a larger environ-
mental policy setting, which include other major environmental problems such as cli-
mate change and local air pollution, the sectoral results may differ substantially due to 
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interaction effects between the different policies (just as the two environmental themes 
investigated here interact). 
Note that the DEAN-W is applied to long-term or mid-term analysis, so that short-run 
economic fluctuations (business cycle effects) are ignored. Moreover, the model assumes 
that the levels of emission are constant after the WFD target is reached.  
If we compare the results of DEAN-W and the static AGE model in Brouwer et al. 
(2007), the decline in Net National Income seems to be much lower in the dynamic 
model than in the static model. As the dynamic model predicts a 0.8 percent loss in NNI 
compared to the benchmark in 2015, the static model predicts a 10 percent loss in NNI. 
Apart from differences caused by the different data sources,16 the dynamic aspects of 
autonomous emission efficiency and developments in the abatement cost curves are ig-
nored in the static model results. Similar differences between the dynamic and static 
model (both calibrated to 1990) in the evaluation of a wide range of environmental prob-
lems are found in Dellink (2005), who analyses the differences in detail. 
There are some obvious areas for improvement of our analysis. First, the balanced 
growth path assumed in the model is relatively simple, and disregards structural changes 
in preferences and the structure of the economy. It is expected that most service (sub-) 
sectors in the economy show a more than proportional growth rate, while the reverse is 
the case in the agricultural sector. Secondly, the model represents a national economy, 
where the environmental issues at stake are largely regional. Regionalising the model 
will improve the link between economic activity and water pollution, as the activities can 
be closely linked to specific water bodies. This comes at a cost, however, that a lower 
geographical scale of analysis will complicate the description of economic interactions. 
At the national level, relevant data exists on how different sectors interact, but at the re-
gional level, serious data problems arise. This topic is dealt with in Linderhof and 
Reinhard (2007). Thirdly, although it is possible to softlink the national results with 
more detailed models at the scale of individual river basins, such as the WFD Explorer 
model constructed by WL Delft for surface water quality in the Netherlands, a more di-
rect link would improve the analysis. Preliminary results for such a softlink are available 
in Stone et al. (2007), which also discusses opportunities and pitfalls for an enhanced in-
tegration of the economic and hydrologic models. Fourthly, the representation of water 
quality in the model is highly stylized and deserves a more disaggregated approach. A 
first step is to consider individual substances instead of environmental themes, although 
we might run into problems with the data availability of the Pollution-Abatement curves. 
Finally, the abatement cost functions used can be specified for individual sectors when 
the appropriate data are available. While it might be infeasible to extent the model in all 
directions simultaneously, it is the ambition of the WEMPA project to provide further 
insights into many of these issues in order to come to the best available assessment of the 
economic impacts of the WFD.  
                                                   
16
 DEAN-W uses updated emission and economic data for the year 2000 in comparison with 
Brouwer et al. (2007). 
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